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         ABSTRACT  
Regional human rights bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Right, have constituent 
instruments, which contain clauses allowing states to leave the institution. 
Given that regional human rights tribunals have the power to issue rulings 
against states, these clauses have been relatively underused. This paper 
argues this is due to the socialisation of states with regional human rights 
regimes. Exit clauses are a reflection of underlying political forces behind a 
regional human rights bodies’ formation. They also play an important and 
under examined state socialisation once a state is a member of a regional 
human rights body.  
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Introduction  
Eric Posner’s book The Twilight of Human Rights Law, argued that human rights law 
suffered from a naiveté in assuming that complex international legal structures with relatively 
limited powers could actually change the situation people faced in some countries.
1
 Regional 
human rights organisations, with their attendant tribunals, appear to provide an answer to this 
problem as they can interpret rights in a manner that reflects the common values of states 
within their region and as a consequence means they often have far more legitimacy as 
organisations.
2
 Nevertheless regional tribunals also suffer from the basic problem that many 
supranational bodies suffer from - legal rules once defined are not always obeyed by states. 
As constitutive theorists of international human rights law have argued, seeing legal 
instruments as both constituting relationships as well as defining the limits of acceptable 
behaviour is important for understanding how human rights law progressively changes state 
behaviour over time.
3
 This has been accompanied more generally by a wealth of theoretical 
and empirical literature arguing that human rights organisations, in particular regional human 
rights organisations, can have a role in socialising states progressively altering their 
behaviour through continued interactions within an organisational framework in order to 
make them more human rights compliant.
4
   
Yet, exit clauses – the denunciation or withdrawal provisions - of the human rights 
instruments legally underpinning regional human rights organisations remain underexplored 
in the context of state socialisation. These clauses seemingly undermine the power of 
tribunals to issue decisions against state parties, as it gives states a legal escape hatch to avoid 
future scrutiny of their human rights records. The decision of the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) that the absence of an exit clause means a state cannot leave a human rights treaty has 
been widely accepted as a general statement of international law and some human rights 
obligations are binding on states outside any obligation they have under a human rights 
                                                          
1  Eric Posner The Twlight of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2014). 
2 This was a feature of early comparative literature on regional organisations Bina Obinna Okere ‘The protection of human 
rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: a comparative analysis with the European and 
American systems.’ (1984) 6 Human Rights Quarterly 141. 
3 Geoff Dancey and Christopher Farris ‘Rescuing Human Rights Law From International Legalism and its Critics’ (2017) 39 
Human Rights Quarterly 1, 3-4. 
4  For indicative examples see Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks Socialising States: Promoting Human Rights Through 
International Law  (Oxford University Press 2013); Beth Simmons ‘From ratification to compliance: Quantitative evidence 
on the spiral model’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) The Persistent Power of Human Rights: 
From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013) 43; Brian Greenhill ‘The Company You Keep: 
International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms’ (2010) 54 International Studies Quarterly 127. 
treaty.
5
  Yet viewing exit clauses through a narrow legal lens obscures the role exit clauses 
play in state socialisation. Whilst the escape mechanism of an exit clause provides a notional 
incentive for states to become party to a human rights treaty, as it and reconciles concerns 
about the protection of their sovereignty, once a state becomes a member of a human rights 
regime their preferences and incentives are shaped by that regime. Equally exit clauses work 
along with other provisions, serve to delineate states, which are rights compliant from those, 
which are non-compliant, which has the overall effect of enhancing the socialisation of states 
with a human rights regime.     
The first section of this article looks at exit clauses within regional human rights 
organisations, arguing that their form and operation is a reflection of the structure of a 
regional instrument. In the second section exit clauses are situated within the analysis of state 
socialisation more generally to demonstrate how they impact incentives towards commitment 
and compliance with a regional human rights tribunal. Exit clauses demonstrate how 
rationalist theories, focusing on the relative advantage states pursue when acting inside 
international organisations, offer only a limited explanation of the way that human rights 
regimes function. The third section examines the use, and threatened use, of exit clauses in 
regional human rights regimes, arguing that these instances represent either the limits of 
organisational authority or the breakdown of socialisation underpinning a human rights 
regime. Where exit clauses are used by states to engage in a form of bargaining to maximise 
their interests, without actually withdrawing from a tribunal, this can undermine the authority 
of an organisation as a whole.  
1. Exit clauses in regional human rights organisations 
There are three regional human rights bodies which are important to assess in the context of 
exiting treaties – the Council of Europe (of which the European Court on Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is an integral part), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
African Commission and Court (which are bodies under the auspices of the African Union 
(AU)) Out of the three human rights instruments which define the rights these bodies are 
empowered to protect, two contain exit clauses – the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) – and one of them does not – 
the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).  What links all of these 
                                                          
5 See Elizabeth Evatt ‘Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ICCPR: Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of 
Self-Defence’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Human Rights 251.  
organisations in contrast to other regional human rights bodies such as the Association of 
South East Asian Nations Human Rights Commission, is that all three of them have tribunals, 
which have issued decisions by against member states. All three human rights regimes also 
allow a form of individual petition. These powers potentially interfere with a state’s 
sovereign decision making and therefore are more likely to create incentives for a state to exit 
a regional human rights organisation.  
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights  
Article 58 of the ECHR allows the Convention to be denounced by state parties, which then 
releases the state from its obligations under the Convention including the obligation to 
comply with judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It however is 
only applicable five years after a state becomes a party and only comes into effect six months 
after notification of the denunciation to the Council of Europe. Furthermore Article 58(3) 
operates as a savings clause as it prevents a state from relinquishing their obligations under 
the Convention “in respect of any act which, being capable of constituting a violation of such 
obligations, may have been performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became 
effective.” 6  Although this proposition has never been tested there is an interesting 
interconnection between Article 58 and Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
that requires new applicant states to the EU to become party to the ECHR. Theoretically 
withdrawal from the ECHR and continued membership of the EU is possible as both remain 
separate treaties, but it would be in tension with provisions in the TEU requiring member 
states to respect the values of the EU.
7
 The EU Justice Commissioner and the President of the 
Commission have both indicated that withdrawing from the ECHR would raise concerns “as 
regards the effective protection of fundamental rights.”8 In general terms the relatively high 
level of political and economic integration between states across Europe has helped to cement 
commitment to the ECHR. 
The ECHR’s Travaux Préparatoires show that Article 58 was considered in the Fifth Session 
of Ministers in early 1950 along with a number of other procedural measures. Some states 
were reluctant to include it but the United Kingdom saw Article 58 alongside Article 56 (the 
                                                          
6  European Convention on Human Rights 4 November 1950 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) Article 
58(3).   
7  See  Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
2007 Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390,  Article 2, 6 and 7  
8 Radoslav Milkov ‘Withdrawal of a Contracting Party from the ECHR: Is it Possible and What are the Legal 
Consequences?’ (2014) Available at SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2669220 >. 
clause limiting the application of the ECHR to territories held under colonial rule by state 
parties to the Convention) as an important package of measures designed to limit the 
application of Convention.
9
 Interestingly it was an early interstate case concerning the then 
British colony of Cyprus that first led the UK to consider denouncing the Convention.
10
 Yet, 
the UK was to subsequently affirm the right of individual petition to the Commission, and 
maintain it even when faced with rulings against them arising from cases in Northern Ireland. 
The UK later supported the implementation of Protocol 11 in making the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction compulsory and abolished the Commission as a separate institution. Greece 
infamously withdrew from the Council of Europe – being the only state to date to take 
advantage of Article 58 after failing to reach a friendly settlement in a series of interstate 
cases involving torture and the deprivation of a right to fair trial following a coup d’etat in 
the country.
11
 Yet Greece was to later apply to rejoin the Council of Europe after a change of 
government. In the early 1980s Turkey was faced with a similar situation following the 
installation of a military government but opted for a friendly resolution.
12
 
1.2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
Although the Inter-American human rights system pre-dates the 1969 ACHR, the Convention 
is the instrument that is central to the operation of the Commission and the Court.
13
 Article 78 
is a denunciation clause shaped in a similar fashion to Article 58 of the ECHR by operating 
as a savings clause.  The Travaux Préparatoires, the record of the 1969 Inter-American 
Conference on Human Rights, detail that the drafters of the Convention were concerned that 
states would use the denunciation provisions to escape their overall rights obligations.
14
 
Unlike the ECtHR, which now has compulsory jurisdiction, the Inter American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) has a more complex system – the Inter American Commission of 
Human Rights can refer cases to the Court, or states can accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 
In 1999 when Peru tried to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court but remain in the 
Convention the Court held that the only option for Peru was to renounce the Convention as a 
                                                          
9 Collected Edition of the Travaux Préparatoires of the European Convention on Human Rights Vol.5  (Martinus Nijhoff 
1975). 
10 See Greece v United Kingdom (II) (1957) App no. 299/57.  
11 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece (1970) App no. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67. 
12 Ralph Beddard Human Rights and Europe (Cambridge University Press 1993) 8-9. 
13 Cristiane Lucena Carneiro and Simone Wegman ‘Institutional complexity in the Inter-American Human Rights System: an 
investigation of the prohibition of torture’ International Journal of Human Rights (published online 28 Feb 2017) < 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1290322 >. 
14 Organisation of the American States ‘Documents of the 1969 Inter-American Conference on Human Rights (Travaux 
préparatoires)’ OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2 7-22 November 1969.  
whole.
15
 Peru had been one of the earliest states to deposit a declaration for the Court’s 
contentious jurisdiction and made its attempted withdrawal six weeks after proceedings had 
been commenced against it, clearly was attempting exactly what the drafters of the ACHR 
had feared that a denunciation clause would be used for. Withdrawals, or threatened 
withdrawals, from Caribbean states in the late 1990s were all initiated by the specific issue of 
the death penalty and the ability of individuals on death row to access the Court. This is 
discussed in more depth in section 3 below but it is important to note that following the initial 
withdrawal of Trinidad and Tobago there was no real sign of a wider exodus of states. 
Other denunciations of the ACHR have not followed any discernible pattern. Venezuela’s 
withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction in 2012 was driven by the growing concern that 
activists from opposition political parties could utilise the Court with the government 
criticising the IACtHR for engaging in “political manipulation”. 16  When the Dominican 
Republic withdrew from the ACHR it was notionally over a technical dispute about the 
interpretation of constitutional law. However, the background to the dispute concerned 
whether individuals who were ethnically of Haitian descent were entitled to Dominican 
citizenship, which was a politically controversial issue, and the Dominican courts had resisted 
implementing several IACtHR judgments.
17
 Some have attempted to frame the backlash and 
withdrawals from IACtHR in the context of the Court and Commission’s complex evolution 
of powers. For instance Gerald Neuman argued that it was issuing rulings that risked 
becoming “too divorced from the consensual aspect” of a regional human rights organization 
and absent “strategic institutional design” there was a risk that the broader legitimacy of the 
IACtHR would be undermined.
18
 Scholars of the Court have observed that it acquired its 
legitimacy progressively, in part through assisting some countries with transitional justice 
initiatives following the collapse of military dictatorships in the 1980s and 1990s.
19
 Through 
a constructivist lens there are two ways of understanding these development; states incentives 
changed as they moved away from dictatorial models of governance, and therefore came to 
value the Court as an institution. Equally it could be argued the Commission and the Court’s 
institutional authority was to an extent contingent on the IACtHR’s performance. Both 
                                                          
15 Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru Judgement of Sept. 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 355. 
16  Rachel Boothroyd ‘Chavez Announces “Immediate” Withdrawal from Inter-American Court of Human Rights’  
Venezuelanalysis.com (26 July 2012) <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7131>  
17  Addison Morris ‘Dominican Republic leaves Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Jurist (6 November 2014) 
<http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/11/dominican-republic-leaves-inter-american-court-of-human-rights.php > 
18 Gerald Neuman ‘Import, Export and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 101, 123. 
19 Tom Farer ‘The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox’ (1997) 19 
Human Rights Quarterly 510. 
explanations serve to highlight how distinct the ECtHR’s political legitimacy, which was 
often linked to common historical factors and European integration, is from the IACtHR.  
1.3 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
There are no formal mechanisms to withdraw from the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and it is not mentioned anywhere in its rules of procedure or in the ACHPR.  
The African Court Protocol to the ACHPR contains a clause that requires states to file a 
declaration stating that they are willing to allow petitions from individuals within their 
jurisdiction.
20
 It is also open for states to withdraw these declarations although this has only 
been used by one state to date and its relative underuse is in part a reflection of the fact that 
so few states made such declarations in the first place.
21
  Explaining why there is no 
withdrawal clause in the ACHPR is not easy in part because no official Travaux Préparatoires 
of the Charter exist, although Bertrand Ramcharan has managed to publish a number of 
documents from the UN sponsored Monrovia Conference in July 1979.
22
  These show that 
proposals for a Commission with broad powers formed part of early discussions about the 
Charter but these were then watered down considerably in its final draft.
23
  This led to some 
considerable criticism from early writers on the African human rights system who claimed 
that it prioritised the interest of states over the protection of human rights.
24
 The debate over 
clawback clauses – a feature of the substantive provisions within the Charter which allows 
states to define, implement and apply rights “in a manner that may deprive [them] of any real 
substance” – seems to support this argument as such clauses allow states a far larger margin 
of appreciation than is possible under other regional instruments.
25
 Yet there were other 
features of the Charter that seemed to pull in the opposite direction - for example the absence 
of a derogation clause from the Charter is often attributed to the fear that states would abuse 
                                                          
20 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights, Art 34(6).  
21 For a background see IJRC ‘Rwanda Withdraws access to African court for Indviduals and NGOs’ International Justice 
Resource Centre (14 March 2016)  <http://www.ijrcenter.org/2016/03/14/rwanda-withdraws-access-to-african-court-for-
individuals-and-ngos/ >.  
22 Bertrand Ramcharan ‘The Travaux Préparatoires of the African Commission on Human Rights’ (1992) 13 Human Rights 
Law Journal 307. 
23 See also Frans Viljoen ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires in the Light of 
Subsequent Practice’ (2004) 25 Human Rights Law Journal 316, 318.  
24 See U Umozurike, 'The Protection of Human Rights under The Banjul (African) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' 
(1988) 1 African Journal of International Law 82; Kevin Mathews ‘The OAU and Political Economy of Human Rights in 
Africa: An Analysis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (1987) 34 African Today 85.  
25 Quote from Laurent Sermet ‘The absence of a derogation clause from African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: a 
critical discussion’ (1992) 7 African Human Rights Law Journal 142; Viljoen ‘Admissibility under the African Charter’ 
From Evans and Murray (eds.) The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: The System in Practice 1986-2006 
(Cambridge University Press 2nd ed. 2006) 72.  
emergency powers and restrict human rights.
26
 It is not clear why there is no exit clause in the 
Charter and there is no real scholarly explanation of the absence of an exit clause, but this 
may well have been a combination of caution at the potential use of an exit clause and 
another example of the relatively underdeveloped nature of the enforcement powers within 
the Charter itself.  
It is also noteworthy that other treaties such as the African Charter on the Rights of the Child 
1990 also contain no withdrawal clause. The only instrument in the African human rights 
system containing a withdrawal clause is the 2009 Kampala Convention on Internally 
Displaced Persons, which requires reasons to be given for a denunciation to occur.
27
 This 
would seem to indicate that the general principle contained in Article 56 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties – that denunciation is only possible where there is either an 
express provision allowing states to do so or the right is implied from the nature of the treaty 
– is applicable in the case of the ACHPR.28  But no state has yet tried to renounce the Charter 
all together and put this point to the test. The relationship between the Commission and the 
African Union (AU) is more complex than the relationship between the ECHR and EU.  The 
2000 Constitutive Act of the Union AU states that the promotion of the Charter is one of its 
core objectives and the Commission is tasked with referring its Activity Report to the AU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, however this is not really an enforcement 
mechanism in any meaningful sense.
29
  It is possible to withdraw from the AU and Morocco 
infamously quit its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, over its disputed 
territorial claims in Western Sahara.
30
 Along with other Sub-Regional organisations in 
Africa, the AU has the power to expel member states, which has proved indirectly important 
in the promotion of human rights, albeit mostly in the specific (and often limited) set of 
circumstances where human rights violations arise after an unconstitutional transfer of 
power.
31
   
2. Exit Clauses and the Socialisation of States in Regional Organisations  
                                                          
26 Ibid Sermet – this is also reflected in the Commission’s jurisprudence. 
27 See Gino Naldi and Konstantinos Magliveras ‘Human Rights and the Denunciation of Treaties and Withdrawal from 
International Organisations’ (2013) 33 Polish Yearbook of International Law 95, 103-105. 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 1155 UNTS 331 27 January 1980 Art 56 (1).   
29Omoleye Benson Olukayode ‘Enforcement and Implementation Mechanisms of the African Human Rights Charter: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2015) 40 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 47.  
30 For background see John Damis ‘Morocco and the Western Sahara’ (1990) 89 Current History 165. 
31 See Frederick Cowell ‘Preventing coups in Africa: attempts at the protection of human rights and constitutions’ (2011) 15 
The International Journal of Human Rights 749.  
Regional organisations often emerge as a reflection of the shared political conditions 
operating within the region and their legal structure can subsequently socialise states, leading 
them to internalise new norms or values.
32
  There is a broader dispute among theorists of 
international organisations about whether rationalism or socialisation explains the process of 
membership and compliance with an organisation.
33
  The rationalist school of thought 
broadly maintains that states approach international organisations instrumentally, seeking out 
gains from membership, and see compliance as a means of gaining distinct advantages for 
themselves. Socialisation stems from constructivist schools of thought and maintains that a 
state’s interests are conditioned by adherence to value systems, which may be non-material in 
nature, and are to a large extent constructed by the environment around them.
34
. Socialisation, 
and the theory of constructivism in international law, has sometimes been criticised for 
diluting down the role of obligation in international law or representing an unrealistic 
portrayal of the interactions that alter states’ behaviour.35 In practice state socialisation within 
a regional organisation is often subject to a variety of social factors, such as the relative 
political integration of states outside of that organisation, which can lead states to engage in 
different forms of strategic calculation about their behaviour, making the picture more 
complex than the sharp divide between rationalism and socialisation might suggest.
36
 
Yet when it comes to human rights organisations there is little evidence that rationalist 
incentives, such as material gain, are particularly relevant in explaining either why states 
commit to them and then subsequently comply with them, seemingly casting doubt on strictly 
rationalist explanations.
37
 Also in the precise context of regional organisations, socialisation 
can help explain not only why states become members of an organisation but also, in the 
specific context of exit clauses, why states are disincentivized from leaving an organisation. 
Regional human rights organisations are, as Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal note, the 
                                                          
32 See Jeffery Checkle ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’ (2005) 59 
International Organization 801.  
33 For indicative examples see Frank Schimmelfennig ‘International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an 
Institutional Environment’ (2000) 6 European Journal of International Relations 109; Jeffery Checkel ‘International norms 
and domestic politics: Bridging the rationalist—Constructivist divide’ (1997) 4 European Journal of international 
relations 473. 
34
 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope. "International law and constructivism: elements of an interactional theory of 
international law’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of  Transnational Law  19. 
35 This argument can be found in criticism of constructivism more generally David Roth-Isigkeit ‘The blinkered discipline?: 
Martti Koskenniemi and interdisciplinary approaches to international law’ (2017) 9 International Theory 410; See also, 
Tomer Broude "Behavioral international law’ (2014) 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1099. 
36 Checkel ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’ (2005) 54 International 
Organization 801. 
37 See Emilie Hafner-Burton, Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse ‘Human Rights Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and 
Democratization’ (2015) 45 British Journal of Political Science 1; Richard Nielsen and Beth Simmons ‘Rewards for 
Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?’ (2015) 59 International Studies 
Quarterly 197.  
type of organisation specifically established “to act as a representative or embodiment of 
states” and their values, which means that as organisations they are intending to construct 
value systems.
38
 Their socialisation function is about encouraging and maintaining shared 
human rights standards and protecting human rights within a regional community of states. 
This involves their tribunals making findings against member states in response to complaints 
about human rights violations in a way that is often contested by states. To unpack how exit 
clauses within a regional human rights instrument interact with organisational socialisation it 
is first necessary to give a brief overview of socialisation theory before analysing the role of 
exit clauses in this process.  
 
2.1 Commitment, compliance and the role of socialisation in regional human rights 
organisations 
To fully understand socialisation in the context of states remaining within an organisation it is 
necessary to differentiate between the politics of commitment and the politics of compliance 
to a regional human rights organisation. Commitment to a regional organisation describes the 
process of becoming a member via the ratification of its constituent treaty and involves 
conferring on the organisation certain powers that the state would normally possess. Even 
though in the case of regional human rights tribunals their powers are often quite limited, the 
capacity of a tribunal to provide final and authoritative adjudication on particular rights 
claims is nevertheless a form of conferral.
39
 Although the scope of this delegation is often 
contested by states, who argue about the relative powers of a regional human rights 
organisation and what the appropriate jurisdiction of a court or tribunal actually is, there is no 
escaping from the fact that membership of an organisation involves a degree of delegation. 
An important aspect of delegation is, as Dan Saroorshi notes, that the delegating authority (in 
this case the state) always retains the power to revoke the said delegation.
40
  
The political forces at the commitment stage are largely ideographic. Christian Reus-Smit 
describes ideographic politics as institutional arrangements that “permit the construction, 
                                                          
38  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’ (1998) 42 The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, 15-16.  
39 Jaanika Erne ‘Conferral of Powers by States as a Basis of Obligation of International Organisations’ (2009) 78 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 177.  
40 Dan Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security (Clarendon Press, 1999) 5. 
stabilization and demonstration of social identities”.41 This sort of political shared interest 
between states was present at the creation of the ECHR, where there was a strong desire 
amongst states in the Council of Europe to protect against totalitarianism in the aftermath of 
World War Two.
42
  Some states saw membership of the Council of Europe and signing up to 
the ECHR as a means of ‘locking in’ democratic institutions and human rights. This 
reasoning applied both to states in Western Europe in the early 1950s, who sought to lock in 
democracy as a defence against a totalitarian take-over from either fascism or communism, 
but also to states in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, who saw the ECHR as a means of helping 
facilitate their post-soviet transition.
43
 Under a strictly rationalist conception of institutional 
politics, Reus-Smit notes, there is a lack of understanding about how institutions develop and 
why states feel that there is a broad psychological and social obligation upon them to enter 
into a regime.
44
 Ideographic political forces create reputation, or self-identification reasons – 
such as in the case of the ECHR the desire to appear a ‘European’ state – alongside more 
directly transactional reasons to commit to a regional human rights treaty.
45
 
Notionally after the legal process of commitment the law surrounding compliance with a 
treaty, which in the case of a regional human rights treaty binds states to implement its 
provisions and follow the decisions of its tribunals, provides the authority for that tribunal to 
issue decisions against states.
46
  Yet, the act of commitment does not necessarily account for 
the ongoing authority of a tribunal, especially when it has the capacity to issue far-reaching 
judgments and decisions against states with which they are then bound to comply.
47
 The 
literature in this area has highlighted the difference between the politics of socialisation in 
terms of commitment and compliance.
48
 In terms of compliance it is important to see 
socialisation in terms of an ongoing process of acculturation of the state within an 
institution.
49
 This sees the authority of institutions being built up over time, with compliance 
with low cost decisions of a tribunal, positive acknowledgement from other states for ongoing 
                                                          
41 Christian Reus-Smit ‘Politics and International Legal Obligation’ (2003) 9 European Journal of International Relations 
591, 610.  
42 Ed Bates The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the Creation of a Permanent 
Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2010) 96-105. 
43  Andrew Moravcsik ‘The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 217. 
44 Reus-Smit (n 41).  
45 This is outlined in Hafner-Burton et.al (n 37) 10. 
46 Çalı describes this as the ‘standard view’ in Başak Çalı ‘The Disciplinary Account of the Authority of International Law: 
Does It Stand Firm against Its External Critics?’ (2016) 5 ESIL Reflections 1.  
47 Mattias Kumm, ‘The legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 907, 914. 
48 For an example see Xinyuan Dai, ‘The “compliance gap” and efficacy of international human rights institutions’ in Tomas 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 4) 85. 
49 Goodman and Jinks (n 4) 25-35. 
participation and the impact of tribunal decisions on domestic politics, all working in tandem 
to encourage compliance with a tribunal’s decisions. Rather than ideational political forces 
this is closer to acculturation – the process of a state’s incentives changing over time as a 
result of socialisation as an organisational member and its behaviour altering as a 
consequence, in terms of both norm adherence and in respecting the legal authority of the 
institution.
50
 Other models of human rights compliance – such as the spiral model developed 
by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink – also situates human rights regimes as 
actors in a cycle of change that alter a state’s incentives.51  
The notion of socialisation leading to compliance has been explored in a couple of influential 
studies comparing the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Courtney Hillebrecht noted in her study of 
IACtHR that many states in South America were keen to commit to the Convention, in order 
to lock in the results of the democratic transfer they made from military dictatorship in the 
1980s.
52
  Subsequent compliance with judgments that went against state parties, Hillebrecht 
argued, was in part achieved by an alignment of civil society and other actors with the rulings 
of the IACtHR. Hillebrecht demonstrates how in a number of high profile cases in Argentina 
and Brazil activists, as a result of civil society mobilisation, ensured that the government 
eventually complied with judgments.
53
  With a compliance rate of around 60% in relation to 
contentious decisions the Court is less successful than the ECtHR at achieving compliance, 
but this is nevertheless indicative of an overall normative expectation towards compliance 
with IACtHR decisions.
54
 Socialisation within the framework created by the Council of 
Europe through the ECHR occurred against the background of a much wider pattern of 
European integration at the economic and social level, with other supranational organisations 
also exercising pressure towards compliance.
55
  
2.2 Understanding the role of exit clauses in state socialisation  
 The function of exit clauses is relatively obvious regarding incentives to commit to human 
rights regimes; they provide a mechanism that allows a state to depart from a human rights 
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instrument.
56
 This works in tandem with other features incentivising commitment, such as 
ideographic politics, in order to create a set of incentives to encourage states to engage in the 
act of delegation. Whilst the actual practicalities of exiting any organisation may sometimes 
be unrealistic because of the high cost to the state in material or political terms, an exit clause 
opens the possibility of withdrawal.
57
 The discussion of withdrawal clauses during the 
creation of the ECHR and the ACHR to an extent presupposed the existence of an 
adjudicative body, from which states would wish to have some mechanism to exit. The 
absence of a withdrawal clause can therefore be read as reflecting that a sovereignty trade-off 
of this sort was not anticipated by state parties in the process of regime design.  For example, 
the African Commission’s interpretative and adjudicative capacity in relation to individual 
communications was developed at its Third Session when the Commission interpreting its 
mandate from the text of the ACHPR.
58
 It is unclear from the discussion at the time of its 
drafting what the scope of the Commission’s powers to receive individual petitions actually 
was, but this was arguably a feature of the institution’s design. Bina Okere makes this point 
in her comparative study of the ECHR and ACHR, noting that in contrast the ACHPR 
reflected the fact that African states were in the early 1980s “still jealous of their newly 
acquired national sovereignty” and were unwilling to envisage an “international judicial 
organ [for] the arbitration of human rights questions.”59 Nearly two decades later during the 
preliminary discussions on the development of the Protocol to the Charter for an African 
Court of Human and Peoples Rights some states strongly advocated mechanisms that would 
either weaken their powers or limit individual communications.
60
 This explains why the 
Court has a large number of parties to it but so few states have entered a declaration under 
Article 34 allowing individual petition – the requirement to make a declaration to allow 
individual petition (which can be withdrawn) substituted for a withdrawal clause as a 
mechanism allowing states to ensure the protection of their sovereignty. Socialisation in the 
case of the ACHPR wider African system reflected the distinct history and culture of the 
region, where after decolonisation regional frameworks were often shaped by a defensive 
attitude towards state sovereignty.     
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Exit clauses also help entrench a tribunal’s rules and encourage rule of law type behaviour 
within states subject to its jurisdiction. ‘Rule of law type behaviour’ describes how states, that 
may already be compliant with international law more generally, or are inclined towards 
compliance, act as though the decisions of a tribunal bind them.
61
 An expectation of 
compliance thus becomes the default mode of engagement and aggressive non-compliance 
from states or threats of withdrawal are limited.  An exit clause, alongside suspension clauses 
and other clauses detailing the expectation of compliance, all underpin rule of law type 
behaviour by legally defining non-compliant states, outside of the general treaty framework 
and beyond socialisation. Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro argue that the out-casting of 
states for non-compliance with international law puts negative costs on their reputation and 
therefore encourages compliance with international law.
62
 It is often a complex mix of 
reputational concerns and socialised expectations that encourage compliance and what 
suspension or enforcement clauses aim to do is create a juridical format for this process.
63
  
An exit clause allows states to leave of their own volition, which is different from out-
casting, but related in that there is still a reputational cost attached to leaving a regional 
human rights organisation. A state considering activating an exit clause would be placed in 
the position of making a calculation about the reputation cost of leaving versus the costs of 
remaining a member – such as complying or justifying non-compliance with a set of 
decisions which are politically difficult.
64
 Strategic calculations about the costs and benefits 
of remaining party to a regional agreement therefore have to be made within a treaty’s 
framework. As both the ECHR and the ACHR impose savings clauses, meaning that states 
cannot legally abandon their obligations under the Convention, states are not free to exit these 
instruments to continue human rights abuses. Therefore, exit clauses play a function in 
socialisation by both acting along with other provisions to define reputation costs and 
creating a regime of legal constraints on a state that wishes to exit an organisation.  
3. The use of exit clauses and their impact upon socialisation  
The preceding section analysed how the presence (or absence) of an exit clause in an 
instrument reflected the natures of socialisation with respect to both commitment and 
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compliance behind a particular instrument. That however does not capture how an exit clause 
is actually used by state parties, both in terms of activating it and in terms of the political 
discourse around its activation, which in turn affects the nature of regional socialisation. 
Based on current practices, the use of exit clauses can be grouped under three main headings. 
3.1 Threats of exit as leverage for organisational change  
The threat to use an exit clause can be made to alter the regime substantively or at least the 
expectations surrounding it in order to exact meaningful benefits for the state in question – a 
process that Laurence Helfer terms a coordination game.
65
 As Lisa Martin argues, this is not 
necessarily a violation of the treaty in legal terms, but rather an indication of a state’s future 
preferences in an attempt at leveraging the creation of a more favourable regime inside or 
outside that treaty’s framework.66  An example of this strategy is the discussion in the UK of 
a democratic override to the ECtHR. The implementation of the judgment in Hirst v UK 
(No.2), where the ECHR ruled that the blanket ban on prisoners voting was a disproportionate 
restriction of the right to participate in elections, proved highly unpopular and after delaying 
implementing the decision for as long as possible a debate was held in the UK Parliament, 
who finally rejected complying with the decision.
67
 This led some critics of the ECtHR to 
suggest that, whilst it held the presidency of the Council of Europe, the UK should campaign 
for a democratic override – a mechanism where a legislature could vote down, or vote against 
the implementation of a particular ECtHR judgment.
68
  If this was unsuccessful, they argued, 
the UK should exercise Article 58 and leave the Convention. Discussions such as these were 
referred to when the Russian Duma debated a law that was designed to heavily weaken the 
authority of the ECHR by holding that the decisions of the Russian Supreme Court took 
precedence over decisions of the ECtHR.
69
 The Russian government accompanied these 
measures with a series of threats about withdrawal from the ECHR, effectively engaging in 
its own form of unilateral bargaining.
70
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When states bargain in this manner what they are trying to do is engage in what Reus-Smit 
describes as “purposive politics”, where they construct institutions to “enable the negotiation 
and stabilization of [their] collective preferences”.71  This can undermine the ideographic 
politics, which caused the alignment of interests underpinning the socialisation of states at the 
commitment stage, by incentivising states to move towards the acknowledgement of their 
own self-interest in their approach to an institution. The discussions around the Copenhagen 
Declaration illustrate how this has permeated into state behaviour even in situations where 
there are minimal threats of withdrawal. Denmark assumed the presidency of the Council of 
Europe in November 2017 in the midst of an on-going domestic political controversy 
surrounding domestic court decisions over the deportation of foreign nationals, in part due to 
their ECHR obligations, which had led to some domestic political actors calling for far 
reaching reforms of the ECHR and in extreme cases withdrawal.
72
 The Declaration put 
forward a set of proposals for ECtHR reform, including a new doctrine of subsidiarity, which 
was heavily state centric and recommended that the Court should “avoid intervening” in 
asylum and immigration matters “except in the most exceptional circumstances.” 73  As 
commentators noted, such deference would seriously undermine the ECtHR’s ability to 
protect human rights and marked a departure from the existing process for reform of the 
Court.
74
 Coordination games utilising an exit clause encourage behaviour from states that can 
undermine rather than strengthen the relative authority of a human rights tribunal because the 
ideographic politics encouraging commitment are replaced with a more rationalist evaluation 
of the relative gains states can make through membership of a human rights organisation.  
3.2 Non-compliance and threats of exit  
All human rights institutions suffer from some form of non-compliance, but in extreme 
circumstances this can morph into outright hostility or backlash, where a state withdraws 
from a treaty altogether. This can occur due to a decline of a tribunal’s normative authority – 
its capacity to issue decisions on human rights matters which are broadly respected and 
complied with by member states. As Shai Dothan notes, one of the reasons that the ECtHR is 
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able to achieve a relatively high rate of compliance is that its reputation has been enhanced by 
its longevity and consistency, which gives it the freedom to issue relatively costly judgments 
upon state parties.
75
 Yet, this is not an unlimited reservoir of authority and, as Alter, Helfer 
and Madsen argue, the authority of a given tribunal will in many ways depend on its audience 
– the states who are under its jurisdiction due to organisational membership, or who have 
consented to be under a tribunal’s authority.76 Alter, Helfer and Madsen differentiate between 
legal authority, represented by the formal delegation of authority by an international 
instrument, and factual authority, the political expectation that compliance with an institution 
is necessary.
77
 Although a tribunal can maintain its legal authority, by virtue of the legal 
obligations in its constituent treaty, its factual authority may decline due to the way that states 
react to an institution and if they seek to use exit clauses for tactical political advantage.  
As a former judge of the ECtHR noted, as long as the Court has existed there have been 
critics who argue that the Court has been going too far it its interpretations of the ECHR or 
that its judgments lack legitimacy.
78
 He went onto observe that in the late 2000s a 
combination of fear over terrorism and increasing “Euro-phobia” in the wake of the financial 
crisis began to generate hostility towards the Court.
79
 Reactions to cases such as Lautsi v 
Italy, where at first instance the ECtHR held that the Italian practice of displaying a crucifix 
in all school classrooms was incompatible with the right to freedom of religion, led to 
concerted civil society campaigns in Italy in favour of leaving the ECHR.
80
 One of the most 
significant examples of this occurred following the Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary case, where 
two asylum seekers successfully claimed that Hungary’s detention policy for refugees 
violated their rights under Article 3 and 5 of the ECHR.
81
 Less than a week after the 
judgment, leading figures in the governing Fidesz party issued a warning that they would 
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have to review their obligations under the treaty and would consider leaving the Court all 
together.
82
  
Unlike the leverage described above, threats of exit in this scenario are not being used to 
reconstruct or create new legal obligations, but to undermine existing ones. Institutional 
socialisation requires a clear delineation between states with the required characteristics – in 
this case compliance with a human rights tribunal - or states that are willing to acquire those 
characteristics. Where this demarcation becomes blurred what Trine Flockhart describes as 
the “self-other identification” process of differentiating between different types of states 
breaks down.
83
 ‘Self-other’ identification, or more precisely a state’s desire to not become 
‘outcasted’ from a regional organisation, is essential to the legal framework of a tribunal as it 
provides one of the main socialised underpinning to compliance clauses.
84
  Threatening exit 
whilst maintaining non-compliance undermines this process entirely as the meaningful 
sanction for non-compliance - institutional suspension – is rendered moot by a state’s overt 
willingness to consider leaving, even if that overt willingness marks a covert preference of 
continued membership, whilst not complying with a particular decision of a tribunal. A 
category of bespoke organisational membership is thus engineered by default, as a state is 
allowed to engage in ‘a la carte’ compliance, where they choose which decisions of tribunal 
to comply with as if ordering off a menu, which in turn weakens the overall authority of the 
tribunal.
85
  
A related problem can occur if a state is able to use an exit clause as a way of counteracting 
on-going proceedings against them.  Rwanda withdrew its declaration allowing individual 
petition to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights as the judgment in the case of 
Ingabire v Rwanda was pending.
86
 Although this did not affect the Court’s ability to hear the 
matter and find against Rwanda for its disproportionate punishment of the applicant under the 
country’s genocide ideology laws, the nature and timing of the withdrawal would, as Tom 
Daly and Micha Wiebusch note, likely encourage other states to contemplate a similar course 
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of action if a case is going against them.
87
  The fact so few states entered a declaration 
allowing individual petition in the first place meant that there was a limited social expectation 
for states that were party to the African Charter to make such a commitment, in turn making 
it relatively easy for states to simply withdraw their declaration. This context meant that the 
model of outcasting, outlined above, was not really applicable in this case. 
3.3 Exodus Effects: why a state leaving harms the organisation as a whole   
Each state activating, or threatening to activate, a withdrawal clause ostensibly does so for 
individual reasons, but given the nature of socialisation at both the commitment and the 
compliance stage an individual act of withdrawal has a wider impact on the process of 
socialisation. Given that states often do not wish to comply with decisions that go against 
them and are incentivised, according to acculturation theorists, to comply because of the 
creation of an expectation in favour of compliance, a state departing from an institutional 
framework weakens that overall expectation.
88
 The broader problem faced by regional bodies 
is that an individual exercise of an exit clause could precipitate a much larger exodus effect 
where a number of states simultaneously leave an organisation affecting the underlying 
socialisation at the commitment stage. 
The closest example of this is the withdrawal and threatened withdrawal of Caribbean states 
from the IACtHR over the death penalty. In 1997, following a decision of the Privy Council 
in London, 28 citizens of Trinidad and Tobago petitioned the Commission over their length 
of time on death row and the IACtHR ordered that interim measures be put in place for 
individuals on death row.
89
  In response the government of Trinidad and Tobago withdrew 
from the ACHR alltogether, justifying its actions politically by claiming that death row 
inmates were “abusing” their rights by appealing to supranational courts, such as the 
IACtHR.
90
 At an Organization of American States (OAS) summit in 1998 other governments 
from the Caribbean threatened to withdraw from the Court in solidarity with the Trinidadian 
government and human rights NGOs worried that this would undermine the rule of law more 
generally in the region.
91
 This came alongside other denunciations of Optional Protocol One 
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to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) from Jamaica and 
Guyana, which were designed to prevent access to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) for 
convicts on death row.
92
 At a 1999 Caribbean Community (Caricom) summit nine Caribbean 
states approved the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice.
93
 This was in part 
intended to be a sub-regional tribunal for criminal appeals and there was a strong 
presumption the court was created in part to accommodate these states’ particular preferences 
for the death penalty. 
Helfer’s landmark article on the case concluded that “overlegalization” had altered the 
implicit bargains that had led to treaty commitment in the first place.
94
 In this case a 
relatively tiny minority who were seen to benefit from membership of IACtHR, namely 
convicted criminals, were so politically toxic that this undermined the overall social authority 
of the organisation as a whole.
95
  The exodus of states, which ended up being more limited 
than initially anticipated, was however less a result of the legalisation of the institution in an 
abstract sense and more to do with socialisation. As outlined above, in contrast to the ECHR, 
the Court gained its legitimacy less through a larger founding ideational argument at the 
commitment stage, but rather over time was able to establish legitimacy through its decisions 
in particular areas. This meant that in places its social authority required the results of a 
particular case to be accepted as legitimate in order to cement its authority as an institution, 
making its legitimacy content dependent, rather than possessing a form of ideational political 
identity as the basis of its social authority, which can allow an institution to generate content 
independent legitimacy.
96
 An exodus effect is largely dependent on the specific political 
circumstances of an individual exit, and thus the general overall conclusions that can be 
extrapolated from any one example are limited. Yet, what is important to note is that the 
different socialised underpinnings of a human rights body can be a factor in determining 
whether a broader incentive to leave is created by one state using an exit clause..   
Conclusion 
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Because human rights organisations often attempt to attract new members, as part of their 
mission of promoting human rights, exit clauses and the effect of exit clauses seemingly 
compromise this mission. The range of behaviour that they can facilitate, such as leveraging 
tactical concessions to suit an individual state’s self-interest, can directly undermine the 
social authority of an organisation’s tribunal. As the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, warned in 2016 the ‘direct challenges to the authority of the 
Court [ECtHR] within a handful of member states’ were contributing to weakening the rule 
of law in the Convention system.
97
 Threats of exit from both the UK and Russia were playing 
a crucial part in this process. But it is crucial to note that it is not the presence of exit clauses 
themselves that encourages states to act in this manner. The experience of the African Human 
Rights system demonstrates the absence of formal exit clauses can still encourage states to 
find ways around the authority of tribunals or utilise other mechanisms, as was the case with 
declarations allowing individual petition to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
that operate in a manner similar to withdrawal clauses.
98
  
It is the weakening or absence of ideational politics, rather than the presence of an exit clause 
in a regional human rights instrument, which is the major driver behind this type of state 
behaviour. Socialisation built on ideational political factors allows greater room for the 
content independent authority of a tribunal to develop. Whilst an exit clause may serve as an 
initial spur to commitment it is this former factor that is the most important for locking in 
state compliance over the long term. Simply viewing a human rights instrument through the 
prism of legal obligations dilutes the importance of social factors in maintaining compliance 
with those obligations.
99
 Exit clauses in regional human rights organisations, and the fact that 
so few states to date have utilised exit clauses, highlights just how important the factors 
beyond the black-letter law of a regional human rights instrument can be.  
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